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CONGRESS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND THE WAR ON
TERRORISM
Neal Devins"
In exercising his war-making powers, the President has historically pursued
war-related initiatives that implicate civil liberties. Meanwhile, the Congress, with
little incentive to resist these initiatives, has played a steadily declining role in war-
making. In this Essay, Professor Devins examines this dynamic, and argues that
with Congress largely standing on the sidelines as the President leads the nation
in war, it is the Americanpublic that has become the principal check on the powers
of the President in wartime.
Two weeks after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Supreme Court Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor told a law school audience that "we're likely to experience
more restrictions on our personal freedoms than has ever been the case in our
country."' And while O'Connor did not reveal her thinking on the legality of
proposed anti-terrorism legislation, she made clear that the Court might well be
influenced by social and political forces. Indeed, rather than invoke the language
of lawyers (by speaking about the Framers' intent, stare decisis, and the like),
Justice O'Connor suggested that "a great deal of study, goodwill, and expertise"2
would hold the key to the Court's balancing of civil liberties and national security.
Fourteen years earlier, when the Senate was considering Robert Bork's
Supreme Court nomination, social and political forces also played a decisive role.
At that time, however, civil libertarians held the upper hand. Rejecting Bork's
claim that the First Amendment should not protect "any speech advocating the
violation of law,"3 the Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that "[o]ur system is
built upon" protecting "[p]olitical dissidents who make statements that flirt with the
edges of the law."4
* Goodrich Professor of Law & Professor of Government, College of William & Mary.
This Essay was prepared for an October 2002 Woodrow Wilson Center seminar on Congress
and Civil Liberties During War. More recent developments are taken into account in the
footnotes, not text, of this Essay. Thanks to Congress Project director Don Wolfsenberger
for inviting me to the seminar. Thanks also to Mary Carol Daly and John Shults for their help
in researching this Essay.
Linda Greenhouse, In New York Visit, O'Connor Foresees Limits on Freedom, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2001, at B5(quoting Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor).
2 Id. (quoting Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor).
S. EXEC. REP. No. 100-7, pt.3, at 51 (1987) (quoting Robert Bork).
4 Id. at 54.
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None of this comes as a surprise. Differences between peace and wartime are
to be expected. "The safer the nation feels, the more weight judges will be willing
to give to the liberty interest. The greater the threat that an activity poses to the
nation's safety, the stronger will the grounds seem for seeking to repress that
activity, even at some cost to liberty."5 Elected officials certainly understand this.6
For this very reason, one did not need a crystal ball to predict Congress's
acquiescence to post-September 11 restrictions on civil liberties.
In the pages that follow, I will explain why it is that (1) the President, more than
Congress, is likely to pursue war-related initiatives that implicate civil liberties, and
(2) Congress rarely has incentive to resist these initiatives. In so doing, I will argue
that the principal check on presidential power comes neither from Congress nor the
Supreme Court; instead, it comes from the American people. "Liberty," as Learned
Hand put it, "lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no
constitution, no law, no court can save it."7
I. THE PAST IS PROLOGUE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
Regardless of what courts decide or elected branches legislate, "the ultimate
security for... [civil rights and liberties] lies in the tolerance of private citizens."'
Popular sentiment, not judicial edicts, explain the eventual repudiation of the 1798
Alien and Sedition Act, the 1917 Espionage Act, the internment of Japanese-
Americans during World War 1I, and McCarthy era restrictions on civil liberties.
At the same time, the American people wait until after the threat of war is over
before reexamining the appropriateness of wartime restrictions on rights and
liberties.
Consider, for example, World War I era restrictions on political speech. In
1915, President Woodrow Wilson informed lawmakers that
the gravest threats against our national peace and safety have been
uttered within our own borders. There are citizens of the United States,
I blush to admit, born under other flags but welcomed under our
generous naturalization laws . . . who have poured the poison of
disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life.9
Richard A. Posner, Security Versus Civil Liberties, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 2001,
at 46.
6 In the wake of September 11, can we imagine today's Senate Judiciary Committee
"disagreeing categorically" with Bork's concern about political dissidents advocating
violence?
' LEARNED HAND, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 189, 190 (3d ed.
1960).
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES xiv (1951).
9 53 CONG. REc. 99 (1915).
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Two years later, Congress enacted the Espionage Act.'" Under this statute, anyone
who "willfully cause[d] or attempt[ed] to cause insubordination [or] disloyalty" in
the military would be subject to "imprisonment for not more than twenty years";"
moreover, the statute deemed "nonmailable" any publication (including letters)
"advocating or urging treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to any law of the
United States."' 2 And while lawmakers turned down a provision allowing the
President to jail anyone publishing materials that he deemed useful to the enemy,
congressional intent was to be restrictive. In particular, lawmakers wanted to send
a message to immigrants: shed your allegiances to foreign nations and ideas or get
out.
Between June 1917 and June 1920, over two thousand people were prosecuted
under the Espionage Act, and over one thousand of those were convicted." For its
part, a unanimous Supreme Court devoted one paragraph to First Amendment
concerns when upholding the Espionage Act in Schenck v. United States.4 By the
end of the war, however, Americans began taking the First Amendment seriously.
With the debate over the Versailles Peace treaty convincing many that their
enthusiasm for the war was misplaced, people became more concerned about their
freedoms. No longer viewing the government as benevolent, many came to value
First Amendment protections and, in so doing, started to embrace the then-emerging
modem civil liberties movement.
The failure of elected officials, judges, and the American people to exercise
their responsibility as guardians of the Constitution continued through World War
II. In particular, the wartime internment of Japanese-Americans represents one of
the most egregious violations of constitutional principles that this nation has ever
witnessed. With no evidence of disloyalty or subversive activity and without the
benefit of any form of hearing, Americans were imprisoned solely because of their
ancestry.
Within weeks of the December 1941 Pearl Harbor assault, Japanese-
Americans - linked by color and culture to a treacherous enemy and lacking
political power - became an easy target for wartime frustration. In testimony
before Congress, California Attorney General Earl Warren claimed that "when we
are dealing with the Caucasian race we have methods that will test the loyalty of
them . . . when we deal with the Japanese we are in an entirely different field and
10 Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (repealed 1948).
Tit. I, § 3, 40 Stat. at 219.
2 Tit. XII, § 2,40 Stat. at 230. For an insightful analysis of both the Act and World War
I era free speech, see DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS (1997).
'3 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 183
(1998), cited in Michael B. Brennan, Book Review, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 221, 229 (1999).
14 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919). At the time of Schenck, the Court had not begun to develop
its speech-protective First Amendment jurisprudence.
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we cannot form any opinion that we believe to be sound."'" On March 21, 1942,
Congress enacted legislation ratifying an FDR executive order that empowered the
military to "prescribe military areas" and "determine, from which any or all persons
may be excluded."' 6 Pointing to "[e]vidence that a tightly knit fifth column exists
-in the United States," members of Congress uniformly supported the legislation,
approving it with little debate in either the House or Senate.' 7
But the evidence Congress pointed to - War Department "findings" - did not
exist. As Assistant Secretary of War John McCtoy put it: "[S]ocial considerations
rather than military ones determine the total exclusion policy."' 8 Before the
Supreme Court, however, allegations by the American Civil Liberties Union of
racial prejudice and inconsistencies in the War Department Report were not enough
to undo the government's internment of Japanese-Americans. Instead, the Court
deferred to the judgment of the "war-making branches of the Government,"
concluding that "hardships are part of war" and that "[c]itizenship has its
responsibilities as well as its privileges."' 9
Eighteen years later, Earl Warren (speaking as Chief Justice of the United
States) argued that the Supreme Court's willingness to go along with the internment
does not "in a broader sense" tell us whether "a given program is constitutional."2
Pointing to "the limitations under which the Court must sometimes operate,"
Warren thought that the people and their elected officials must sometimes "bear the
primary responsibility" for sorting out the Constitution's meaning.21 These words
proved prophetic: Starting with Gerald Ford's 1976 declaration that the evacuation
was "wrong" and culminating in 1988 reparations legislation, elected government
efforts to remedy this injustice revealed an encouraging self-awareness and humility
in popular government.22
And so it goes. During the Red Scare of the early 1950s, all parts of
government and the American people joined forces in limiting free speech. When
the crisis atmosphere lessened with the death of Stalin and end of the Korean War,
"5 National Defense Migration: Hearings on H.R. 113 Before the House Select Comm.
Investigating Nat 'l Def Migration, 77th Cong. pt. 29, at 11,015 (1942) (statement of Earl
Warren, California Attorney General).
16 88 CONG. REc. 2724 (1942) (proclamation of Lt. Gen. J.L. DeWitt).
17 88 CONG. REC. 2723 (1942) (remarks of Sen. Reynolds). See generally id. at 2722-26,
2729-30 (describing the debate over alien control and military zones).
"S Japanese-American and Aleutian Wartime Relocation: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 42 (1984) (quoting John McCloy).
'9 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,218-19 (1944).
20 Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 193 (1962).
21 Id. at 192.
2 Ford's declaration and the legislation that followed were prompted by the efforts of
civil libertarians. See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983); PETER H. IRONS, JUSTICE
DELAYED: THE RECORD OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES (1989).
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the public mood started to change, opening the door for judges interested in
championing First Amendment freedoms.23 Today, the public has relatively little
interest in limiting the weapons used by law enforcement in fighting the war on
terror. As I will discuss, the incentive of both lawmakers and the American people
is to embrace executive branch restrictions on civil liberties. And while Warren
Court expansions of civil liberties protection have changed social norms governing
civil liberties, it is nevertheless true that there has only been modest resistance to
the war on terror-related restrictions on civil liberties.24 Over time, the public and
its elected representatives may change their minds; in the meantime, however, the
war on terror reflects the historical pattern that "[i]t is neither desirable nor
remotely likely that civil liberty will occupy as favored a position in wartime as it
does in peacetime."25
II. THE PRESENT IS PROLOGUE: EXPLAINING THE PRESIDENTIAL
ADVANTAGE IN WAR-MAKING
26
Wartime civil liberties are also captive to the President's ever-expanding power
over war-making. During the past fifty years, presidents have gained more and
more control over foreign relations, especially war-making. Unlike the traditional
(pre-Korean War) practice of leaving to Congress the decision to initiate war
against foreign nations, social and political norms increasingly see the president as
the "sole organ" of the United State in international affairs.27
23 Commenting on Yates v. UnitedStates, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (concluding that the Smith
Act is limited to speech that incites illegal action), I.F. Stone noted that the Court, by making
the "First Amendment a reality again," "reflect[ed] the steadily growing public misgiving and
distaste for... [Joseph McCarthy and others] who have made America look foolish and even
sinister during the last ten years." I.F. STONE, THE HAUNTED FIFTIES 1953-1963, at 203
(1963). For a detailed history of Court-Congress relations at the time of Yates, see WALTER
F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT: A CASE STUDY IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL
PROCESS (1962).
24 For a general treatment of the Warren Court, see LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN
COURTAND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000). For a treatment of how these changing expectations
impact on the war on terror, see Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and
Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261 (2002). For
additional discussion, see infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
25 REHNQUIST, supra note 13, at 224-25. Two years after September 11, there are signs
that the American people and their elected officials are beginning to grow wary of war on
terror-related restrictions on civil liberties. Concerns of overzealous law enforcement have
pressured the administration to launch a public relations campaign to defend its terrorism
efforts. See Eric Lichtblau, Administration Plans Defense of Terror Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
19, 2003, at A I.
26 Portions of this section are drawn from Neal Devins, Abdication by Another Name: An
Ode to Lou Fisher, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 65 (2000).
27 For a history of Congress's diminishing role in war-making, see Louis Fisher,
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Thanks to the singularity ofthe office, presidents are well positioned to advance
their interests before Congress, the nation, and the world. "The opportunities for
presidential imperialism are too numerous to count," according to Terry Moe and
William Howell, "because, when presidents feel it is in their political interests, they
can put whatever decisions they like to strategic use, both in gaining policy
advantage and in pushing out the boundaries of their power.
28
When presidents act, moreover, it is up to the other branches of government to
respond. In other words, presidents often win by default- either because Congress
chooses not to respond or because its response is ineffective. Furthermore, by end-
running the burdensome and oftentimes unsuccessful strategy of seeking legislative
authorization, unilateral presidential action expands the institutional powers and
prerogatives of the presidency. In other words, the president's personal interests
and the presidency's institutional interests are often one and the same.
Presidents, of course, sometimes need Congress to enact legislation. In
pursuing their health care and faith-based initiatives, Bill Clinton and George W.
Bush had little choice but to turn to Congress. Here, Congress has the upper hand.
Rather than having to do battle with the president on his own field (enacting
legislation that is subject to a presidential veto), it is up to the President to
overcome the burden of inertia by cajoling Congress into action. As such, modem
day presidents often advance their agendas through unilateral action rather than
legislative strategies.29
Unlike the presidency, the individual and institutional interests of members of
Congress are often in conflict with one another. While each of Congress's 535
members has some stake in Congress as an institution, parochial interests often
overwhelm this collective good. In particular, members of Congress need to be
reelected to advance their (and their constituents') interests. For this reason,
lawmakers are "trapped in a prisoners' dilemma: all might benefit if they could
cooperate in defending or advancing Congress's power, but each has a strong
incentive to free ride in favor of the local constituency. 30
Nowhere is the gap between legislative and presidential incentives more stark
than war powers. To start with, as Lou Fisher and others have shown, the
CongressionalAbdication: War and Spending Powers, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 931 (1999).
28 Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power ofUnilateralAction, 15
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 138 (1999).
29 See id. at 154-69 (noting that Congress, from 1973-1998, only overturned three of
roughly one thousand executive orders through legislation). See generally RICHARD P.
NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY (1983). For this very reason, President Bush
responded to Congress's intransigence on his faith-based initiative proposal by making use
of existing laws to distribute fifty million dollars to religious organizations to help the
government assist the needy. See Bill Broadway, Faith-Based Groups Benefit From New
Federal Grants, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2002, at B9.
30 Moe & Howell, supra note 28, at 144.
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constitutional design envisions (at a minimum) a significant congressional role.3
Notwithstanding this clear constitutional mandate, the modem Congress has very
little incentive to play a leadership role. This ever-diminishing congressional role
is a byproduct of many factors including the end of the mandatory draft (something
that ensured strong constituent interest in war powers), the launching of military
strikes with little or no casualties, and the changes in how lawmakers run for office
(especially the increasing pressure to pay attention to local constituencies). For all
these reasons, "[riather than oppos[e] the President on a potential military action,"
most members of Congress "find it more convenient to acquiesce and avoid
criticism that they have obstructed a necessary mission."32
Presidents, in contrast, often are motivated to seek war-making power.
Presidents achieve status - fame - by leading the nation into battle." Unwilling
to overcome the burden of inertia and rein in the President, Congress typically
stands on the sidelines. More striking, today's Congress almost always complies
with presidential requests for war-making authority. Nevertheless, modem-day
presidents, rather than allow Congress to tinker with their requests for legislative
authority, often act unilaterally on war-related issues.34 By pointing to existing
federal legislation, their inherent power as Commander in Chief, and U.N.
resolutions and treaties, presidents expand their institutional power through every
fame-inducing exercise of self-interest.
I will elaborate on these themes in the next part of this Essay. Specifically, I
will call attention to the ever-diminishing congressional role in war powers by
detailing both recent legislation supporting George W. Bush's war on terror and
lawmaker acquiescence to most of the President's war-related initiatives.
Ill. CONNECTING THE DOTS: CONGRESS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND
THE WAR ON TERROR
Against the backdrop of Congress's declining role in war-making and the
diminished status of civil liberties during wartime, it is little wonder that (1) the
Bush administration has been the moving force in initiating war on terror-related
limitations on civil liberties, (2) Congress has largely facilitated presidential
dominion of the war on terror by approving most provisions of legislation
"' See generally JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS
OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993); Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995);
W. TAYLOR REVELEY II, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS THE
ARROWS AND OLIVE BRANCH? (1981).
32 Fisher, supra note 27, at 1006.
3 For this very reason, the framers intended that Congress play the dominate role in
initiating military actions. See William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, andthe Power
to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695 (1997).
" See generally Fisher, supra note 27.
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introduced by the White House and generally standing on the sidelines when the
President claimed that the Constitution or existing law supported one or another
initiative, and (3) the public has backed most war-time limitations on civil liberties
(especially those of noncitizens). None of this is to say that Congress has been
irrelevant. Because of above-discussed differences in enacting legislation and
responding to unilateral presidential action, Congress has made modest changes to
the President's legislative proposals. Also, through oversight hearings, television
appearances, newspaper interviews, and the like, members of Congress have played
some role in shaping public discourse and, with it, administration policy. For the
most part, however, Congress's impact has been indirect and relatively
insubstantial.
Consider, for example, the USA Patriot Act:" One week after the September
1 1 attacks, the Department of Justice sent legislation to Congress that would grant
law enforcement agencies additional powers to tap telephones, conduct searches,
monitor the Internet, police financial transactions, share grand jury testimony, and
much more. Although roundly criticized by civil liberties groups,36 members of
Congress - with both the terrorist attacks and the October 2001 anthrax scare on
their minds - wasted little time in placing national security concerns ahead of civil
liberties. Making use of a secretive expedited procedure, the House (voting 357 to
66) and Senate (voting 98 to 1) approved the USA Patriot Act on October 24 (even
though many lawmakers who voted for it never had a chance to read the bill).3 7
For the most part, the final version of the Patriot Act mirrored the
administration's bill. To the extent that members of Congress valued civil liberties,
it was simply too "difficult to launch a frontal challenge to a popular president
before the practical results of his policies are known.""a At the same time, civil
liberty interests scored some modest victories: Congress eliminated a provision that
would have allowed information obtained from foreign government wiretaps to be
used against Americans even if the wiretaps were unconstitutional; Congress
required the administration to file charges, begin deportation proceedings, or release
foreign suspects within seven days; and (most significant) half of the Act's
" Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272.
36 See John Lancaster & Walter Pincus, Proposed Anti-Terrorism Laws Draw Tough
Questions; Lawmakers Express Concerns to Ashcroft, Other Justice Officials A bout Threat
to Civil Liberties, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2001, at A5.
17 See Elizabeth A. Palmer, Terrorism Bill's Sparse Paper Trail May Cause Legal
Vulnerabilities, 59 CQ WEEKLY 2533 (Oct. 27, 2001).
" Elizabeth A. Palmer & Adriel Bettelheim, War and Civil Liberties: Congress Gropes
for a Role, 59 CQ WEEKLY 2820 (Dec. 1, 2001). For a detailed accounting of how national
security concerns overwhelmed civil liberties interest, see Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Six Weeks
in Autumn, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2002, at W6 (Magazine).
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surveillance measures were scheduled to sunset in 2005."9 In these limited but
important ways, the USA Patriot Act calls attention to the ways in which Congress
is well positioned to exercise authority on matters that require legislation (even on
foreign affairs matters where Congress typically defers to the President).
The Patriot Act is revealing for other reasons. First, through the sunset
provision, Congress deferred to the executive, approved a politically popular
measure, and acknowledged the concerns of civil liberties constituents. More to the
point, the sunset provision makes Congress a player of sorts in the implementation
of the Patriot Act. If popular support for the Act and/or the president diminishes,
Congress can simply refuse to renew the Act. Along the way, lawmakers can
participate in the war on terror without having to legislatively override the
president; instead, through oversight hearings and the like, lawmakers can speak
their minds to the Attorney General and others charged with the implementation of
the Act. In this way the Patriot Act reflects Congress's penchant for "fire alarm"
oversight, that is, a system of "rules, procedures, and informal practices" that allow
Congress and its constituents to examine executive branch implementation of
federal statutes.4"
Second, the Act creates numerous opportunities for the President to act
unilaterally. By claiming that his actions are grounded in the Patriot Act, the
president can pursue a range of initiatives that Congress would likely never have
enacted into law. According to civil liberty interests (who, admittedly, have
incentives to overstate their concerns): "The Patriot Act has been almost a complete
sideshow to what has happened administratively .... What they've ended up
accomplishing is what they wanted in the Patriot Act originally and which Congress
refused to give them.""' For example, the Justice Department has aggressively
interpreted Act provisions allowing the government to detain suspects in terrorism
cases.42 Over time, it is likely that the president will continue to extend the Patriot
9 For a chart comparing key provisions of the administration's bill to the House and
Senate bills, see Elizabeth A. Palmer, Anti-Terrorism Bills Headfor Floor Votes, but Tough
Negotiations Lie Ahead, 59 CQ WEEKLY 2327, 2330 (Oct. 6, 2001).
40 Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).For this very reason,
lawmaker interest in the treatment of detainees was piqued by a critical report prepared by
the Justice Department's Inspector General. Specifically, after criticizing the Department for
holding the detainees without bond until they were cleared by the FBI, the Senate Judiciary
Committee held hearings to examine Justice Department policy. See Edward Walsh,
Treatment of Detainees Defended, WASH. POST, June 26, 2003, at A3.
4' Jackie Koszczuk, Lawmakers Struggle to Keep An Eye on Patriot Act, 60 CQ WEEKLY
2284, 2286 (Sept. 7, 2002) (quoting the American Civil Liberties Union's Timothy Edgar).
42 See id. at 2285-86. On some matters, however, the Bush Administration has had to
seek supplemental legislation from Congress. For example, the government cannot seek the
death penalty without specific statutory authority. Consequently, in an effort to expand its
power to launch capital punishment prosecutions, Attorney General Ashcroft has asked
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Act to fit his needs. Unless and until public opinion directly checks the president
or, alternatively, prompts Congress to use its oversight powers to challenge the
expansionist tendencies of the presidency, this pattern will persist.
Third, recognizing that congressional oversight may affect public opinion and
thereby constrain presidential initiatives, civil liberties' interests in Congress have
engaged in a pitched battle with the Bush White House over what documents the
administration turns over to Congress. Consider, for example, the efforts of then
Senate Judiciary Committee chair Patrick Leahy (D-Vt). After observing that "it
would be difficult" for Congress to challenge the administration legislatively, Leahy
spoke of oversight as civil libertarians' best hope of altering policies "by pressuring
the administration to take a second look at their decisions in the face of high-profile
publicity."43 Along these lines, the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings to
examine the Justice Department's handling of classified wiretaps and searches in
terrorism cases." More significantly, the Committee released to the public
information it obtained from the Foreign Intelligence Service Act Court about FBI
misrepresentations (most of which were made during the Clinton administration).45
For its part, the Bush administration has resisted congressional oversight. It has
often refused to share even general information about the Patriot Act's
implementation.46 It has also sought to deflect House Judiciary Committee inquiries
about the administration's use of its new anti-terrorism powers, claiming that the
House Intelligence Committee (not the Judiciary Committee) had jurisdiction over
the issue.47
The reaches (and limits) of the president's power of unilateral action are also
Congress to strengthen the Patriot Act. See Susan Schmidt, Ashcroft Wants Stronger Patriot
Act; Expanded Death Penalty and Bonds Changes Sought, WASH. POST, June 6, 2003, at
All.
"3 Palmer & Bettelheim, supra note 38, at 2823. Likewise, Leahy thought that oversight
was the only way to challenge the Bush administration on its military tribunal order. For
Leahy: "You're not going to be passing legislation in a situation like this .... I'm not
unaware of the polls.... [W]hat can be done is to have real oversight.., make sure we get
honest answers about what is being done . . . ." John Lancaster, Hearings Reflect Some
Unease With Ashcroft's Legal Approach, WASH POST., Dec. 2, 2001, at A25 (quoting Sen.
Patrick J. Leahy).
" Department ofJustice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While DefendingAgainst
Terrorism: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001). At the
time of these hearings, the Senate was under Democratic control. It is unclear how a
Republican led Senate would have pursued oversight.
" See David G. Savage, A Year After: Administration Defends Secret Searches in Terror
War, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2002, at 19.
46 See Koszczuk, supra note 41, at 2284.
41 See Adam Clymer, Justice Dept. Balks at Effort to Study Antiterror Powers, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 15, 2002, at A21. As it turns out, House Intelligence had not sought the
information nor did it plan to oversee the administration of the Patriot Act. Id.
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revealed in two other executive branch initiatives - a November 2001 presidential
order allowing the use of special military courts to try suspected terrorists4 8 and a
Department of Justice program designed to facilitate private citizens' monitoring
of possible terrorist activity (TIPS: Terrorism Information and Prevention
System). 49 The saga of Bush's military tribunal order underscores the limits of
Congress's ability to effectively check presidential orders and - perhaps more
importantly - the potency of social norms (including other countries as well as
elite and public opinion) to constrain administration overreaching. The initial order,
among other things, suggested that trials might not be public and that the death
penalty could be imposed by a two-thirds vote of the tribunal. March 2002
regulations implementing the order, however, declared that trials will be public, that
the death penalty will require a unanimous vote, that defendants must be proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the government will provide military
lawyers for the accused."
For its part Congress placed little pressure on the administration to modify its
initial proposals. December hearings were held, but "lawmakers, aware of Bush's
strong approval ratings, [largely] avoided head-on confrontations on [this and other]
matters related to the war."'" In sharp contrast, editorial writers, law professors, and
European Union allies signaled strong disapproval of the order. 2 Public opinion
polls, moreover, revealed that eighty percent of Americans believed that the
president should make changes in the criminal justice system in consultation with
48 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,
66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
41 OFFICE OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 12
(2002).
" See Dep't of Def., Military Commission Order No. I (Mar. 21, 2002), available
at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf. The implementing
regulations, in large measure, mean that proceedings before a military tribunals "are in most
respects like military trials under the Uniform Code of Military Justice." Goldsmith &
Sunstein, supra note 24, at 288. For a more recent assessment (calling attention to limits
placed on the ability of defense counsel to gather information and engage in confidential
communications with their clients), see Neil A. Lewis, Rules Set Up for Terror Tribunals
May Deter Some Defense Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2003, at Al.
' Adriel Bettelheim, Hill Treads Carefully in Challenging Ashcroft Over Expansion of
Anti-Terror Powers, 59 CQ WEEKLY 2903 (Dec. 8, 2001).
2 For editorials, see A Travesty of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2001, at A24; An Un-
American Secrecy, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17,2001, at B24; Military Justice (Continued), WASH.
POST, Nov. 26, 2001, at A24. For law professor opposition, see Law Professors' and
Lawyers' Letter to Senator Leahy (Dec. 5, 2001), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/
outside/html/PublicAffairs/I 52/Leahy.pdf (letter signed by more than seven hundred law
professors and lawyers opposed to "legally deficient, unnecessary, and unwise" military
tribunal order). For European opposition, see Marc Champion et al., Europe Tour by
Ashcroft Starts Sourly - Moussaoui is Offered Legal Help by France as U.S. Sparks
Unease, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 200 1, at A 18.
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Congress, not by executive order. 3
That the Bush administration responded to these pressures is hardly surprising.
The military tribunal order was but one of many presidential initiatives. By
modifying that order in the face of domestic and intemational criticism, the
President improved his standing with ourallies and with domestic constituents (who
might complicate the administration's effort to pursue other war on terror
initiatives - by battering it in the media, by pressuring Congress to play a more
aggressive oversight role, etc.). Likewise, the administration has little reason to
make use of its modified military tribunal policy; its detention policies are in place
and, if need be, it can make use of civilian courts.54
For similar reasons, the Justice Department responded to criticism of its TIPS
policy. Originally designed to allow mail carriers, utility employees, and truckers
to report suspected terrorist activities, the program was scaled back to "events that
are obviously public" (so that mail carriers and utility workers would not participate
in this voluntary program). 5 This move was a response to public opinion polls
(where more than half expressed concern of law enforcement "snoop[ing] on
people's private lives") and to extensive lobbying by social conservatives and civil
libertarians (lobbying that prompted Congress to prohibit the TIPS Program in the
Homeland Security Act). 6 Unlike the USA Patriot Act and military tribunal order,
the TIPS saga suggests that Congress can constrain administration initiatives. And
while the administration (through threats of a presidential veto) might have been
able to preserve the original program, TIPS - like the military tribunal order -
reveals that the administration is willing to compromise on some initiatives in order
to pursue its broader agenda. In particular, with concerns over civil liberties
growing (at least until the next terrorist attack), the administration has little to gain
by pursuing initiatives that can be likened to a "1984 Orwellian-type situation...
" Robin Toner & Janet Elder, Public is Wary But Supportive on Rights Curbs, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at Al. A slim fifty-one percent majority, moreover, opposed trying
foreigners in military proceedings. Id. In another poll, however, sixty-four percent said that
they favored military tribunals for non-citizens suspected of terrorism. See NPR News, Poll:
Security Trumps Civil Liberties (Nov. 30, 2001), at http://www.npr.org/news/specials/
civillibertiespoll/01 1130.poll.html.
14 See Charles Lane, Debate Crystyallizes on War, Rights; Courts Struggle Over Fighting
Terror vs. Defending Liberties, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2002, at Al.
" Dan Eggen, Under Fire, Justice Shrinks TIPS Program, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2002,
at Al.
56 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 880, 116 Stat. 2135, 2245.
Initially, the House - but not the Senate - defunded TIPS in proposed Homeland Security
legislation. See Eggen, supra note 55; Neil A. Lewis, Traces of Terror: The Attorney
General; Ashcroft's Terrorism Policies Dismay Some Conservatives, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
2002, at A1; Eddy Ramirez, Americans Still Divided on Issue of Rights vs. Security; Survey:
People Oppose Airport Racial Profiling, but Back Monitoring Prisoner-Lawyer Talks, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2002, at A4.
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where neighbors are reporting on neighbors. ' 7
Notwithstanding its decisions to modify its TIPS and military tribunal policies,
the Bush administration has felt relatively little pressure from the public or
Congress on civil liberties issues. Opinion polls show widespread support both for
eliminating constitutional protections to those who enter the country illegally and
for monitoring conversations between accused terrorists and their lawyers." More
telling, only twenty-one percent of those polled in September 2002 think that the
activities of the federal government pose a serious threat to their constitutional
rights.59 Also, in April 2002, over seventy percent of those polled acknowledged
that Americans will have to give up some of their personal freedoms to make the
country safe from terrorist attack.6' In other words, although the public expects the
government to protect personal privacy and other civil liberties, the public seems
willing to give the Bush administration wide latitude in restricting civil liberties.
For its part, Congress has placed few limits on the president. Rather than act
institutionally to check the president, Congress has largely left it to individual
members to speak out on the civil liberty implications of the war on terror. Through
opinion pieces and interviews published in newspapers, appearances on television,
and statements made at hearings or on the floor, lawmakers have engaged in a
variety ofjawboning tactics. In significant measure, these efforts seem very much
like those of media outlets: Instead of using their formal lawmaking and
investigatory powers, members.of Congress use their status to publicize their
concerns (and thereby affect social norms) through the media. That Congress often
makes its voice heard in such an indirect way is to be expected. Formal
congressional action is limited by the president's power of unilateral action, by
Congress's diminishing role on war powers, and by the nation's practice of
affording fewer civil liberties protections during wartime. Over time, the war on
terror may drag on - so much so that public and elite opinion may push Congress
to play a more active role. On the other hand, as it did with military tribunals and
" These are the words of administration supporter Orrin Hatch (R-Utah). See Adam
Clymer, Traces of Terror: Security and Liberty; Worker Corps to be Formed to Report Odd
Activity, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2002, at A 18. For opinion poll data showing increasing
concern about civil liberties, see Richard Morin and Claudia Deane, Altered Lives, Changing
Attitudes; In Poll, MostAmericans Say 9/1i Affected Them Permanently, WASH. POST, Sept.
8, 2002, at Al.
58 See Ramirez, supra note 56.
s ABC News Poll (Sept. 5-8, 2002), available at http://nationaljoumal.com/members/
polltrack/2002/issues/02civilrights.htm. On the other hand, more than sixty percent of those
polls were somewhat or very concerned about losing some of their civil liberties. See CBS
News/N.Y. Times Poll (Sept. 2-5,2002), available at http://nationaljoumal.com/members/
polltrack/2002/issues/02civilrights.htm.
0 CBS News Poll (Apr. 15-18,2002), available athttp://nationaljoumal.com/members/
polltrack/2002/issues/02civilrights.htm.
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TIPS, the Bush administration may preempt a legislative backlash by modifying its
policymaking in ways that avoid such direct confrontations.
IV. CONCLUSION: WHAT ABOUT THE COURTS?
That the administration has successfully advanced most of its agenda before
Congress and the American people is consistent with both the historic record on
wartime civil liberties and the emerging tradition of presidential dominion over war
powers. Past practice also suggests that the judiciary will step aside and let the
administration conduct its war as it sees fit. Yet in the summer and fall of 2002,
federal trial and appellate judges "across the ideological spectrum" sometimes
responded "with skepticism, alarm or downright hostility" to the "administration's
sweeping claims of unbridled executive authority to hold secret deportation
hearings, label and incarcerate 'enemy combatants' without access to lawyers or
judges, and commingle activities of counterintelligence agents and criminal
prosecutors."'
It is difficult to predict whether and how the Supreme Court will resolve these
issues. At this juncture, I anticipate that the administration, ultimately, will be
allowed to pursue all (or nearly all) of its policies. First, as long as the "country still
seems emotionally engaged in this war" (so that Bush administration policies seem
tied to a war effort, not the transformation of the nation into a police state),62 there
is little reason to think that the Court will depart from its normal practice of
deferring to executive branch claims of military necessity. In its 2001-2002 term,
for example, the Justices signaled their concern with terrorism by expanding the
power of police both to detain a suspect for questioning and to search passengers
on a bus.63 In both cases, explicit reference was made to the ongoing war against
61 Linda Greenhouse, War ofSecrets: Judicial Restraint; The Imperial Presidency vs. the
Imperial Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2002, § 4, at 3. In the winter and spring of 2003,
however, federal appeals courts sustained Bush administration initiatives. See Steve Fainaru,
Court Says Detainees' IDs Can Be Kept Secret, WASH. POST, June 18, 2003, at A 1; Louis
Fisher, War on Terror: Who is Minding the Courts on Rights?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003,
at M2; Richard A. Serrano, U.S. Appellate Court RulesAgainst Guantanamo Detainees, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2003, at A19. This is not to say that the Bush Justice Department has
suffered no setbacks. On July 14, 2003, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an en
banc decision rejecting (at least for now) Department efforts to block accused September 11
conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui from questioning a captive AI-Qaida operative in U.S.
custody. Jerry Markon, Moussaoui Prosecutors Defy Judge, WASH. POST, July 15, 2003, at
Al.
62 Marcia Coyle, The Law's Wartime Silence, Pro-Rights Rulings Tend to Come After
Conflict Ends, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 9, 2002, at Al.
63 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
does not require police officers to advise bus passengers of their right not to cooperate and
to refuse consent to searches); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (holding that in
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terrorism: In the bus case, Solicitor General Ted Olson spoke of the need to limit
passenger rights "[i]n the current environment";"4 in the detention case, Justice
O'Connor noted at oral argument that "[w]e live in perhaps a more dangerous age
today than we did when this event took place."65 Second, lower court rulings
against the Bush administration may well be tied to the Justice Department's staking
out unduly extreme positions when narrower fact based claims might well have
prevailed."M In other words, even if the administration loses some skirmishes, it is
quite possible that it will change legal tactics and eventually succeed in advancing
its policies.
Finally, in explaining why Congress will allow the executive to limit wartime
civil liberties, I do not mean to suggest that the situation we face today is akin to
Wilson-era restrictions on political speech or the World War II internment of
Japanese-Americans. The "nation is now far less trusting of government, and far
more solicitous of the accused, than it was sixty [or ninety] years ago.' 67 In
particular, this changing baseline means that the administration will not pursue
certain policies and will moderate policy proposals that are out of line with social
norms. Changes in both the military tribunal order and the TIPS program suggest
that this is the case. For the same reasons proponents of civil liberties should look
to the American people and opinion leaders, not Congress, to constrain
administration initiatives. Limited both by the president's power of unilateral
action and its new-found custom of deferring to the executive on war powers,
evaluating whether reasonable suspicion exists to detain a suspect, the detaining officer's
experience and the context of the event must be considered). Along the same lines, the
Justices (on March 24, 2003) refused to hear an American Civil Liberties Challenge to Bush
Administration monitoring of telephone conversations and e-mails. See Ann Gearan, U.S.
Wins Appeal on Domestic Spy Powers, AP ONLINE, Mar. 24, 2003, available at 2003 WL
1731665. And while the Court did not issue a substantive ruling, their action allowed the
administration to continue (at least for now) making use of wiretaps approved by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court. See also Charles Lane, High Court to Review Religious
College Case, WASH. POST, May 20,2003, at A6 (noting that the Supreme Court rejected an
appeal over the detention of prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay; filed by a group of clergy
and lawyers, the appeal had challenged a lower court ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing
to pursue the litigation).
4 Charles Lane, High Court to Hear Case on Public Searches; Ruling Could Affect
Domestic War on Terrorism, Bush Administration Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2002, at A 10.
65 Linda Greenhouse, Court Rules on Police Searches of Motorists, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
2002, at A 17. For a general treatment on how the War on Terror implicates Fourth and Fifth
Amendment protections (in non-terrorism cases), see William J. Stuntz, Local PolicingAfter
the Terror, 11l YALE L.J. 2137 (2002).
" See Jeffrey Rosen, Private Enemy: Ashcroft Goes Over the Edge, NEW REPUBLIC, July
8, 2002, at 14.
67 Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 24, at 289. Consequently, two years after the
September 11 terrorist attack, concerns of overzealous law enforcement are beginning to
resonate with the American people. See Lichtblau, supra note 25.
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Congress will only be willing to limit the president on matters that are likely moot;
matters in which the American people, opinion leaders, and our allies are likely to
convince the president to change his policies.
